Chronicles of subcrime-3
(being 1 the ORIGINAL, namely in Ireland, Spain, UK and US; 2 the Centre-East EU transition countries 2009-10 collapse. In Phase 3 the € and EU are on the verge of chaos, because of the unsustainable costs-debts of Financial Socialism, plus country-specific stories adding up in a Deutsche uber alles divide)
ITALIAN ABSTRACT FIRST – TOO BIG 2B BAILED OUT: il gioco del cerino tra Zapatero ed una poltrona vuota
2 dic.: il Messaggero apre col governo salva-Bot: Babbo Natale sarà Mario Draghi? E per Tremonti finisce senza gloria: lui sarà la Befana. Ma 3monti non la conta giusta – dietro le quinte..
– Posted by Joseph Cotterill on Dec 02 11:00 (Alphaville)
L’Italia ha 2 problemi strutturali:
a) il debito pubblico creato PERSONALMENTE da Craxi, De Michelis (perche’ non lo ripaga ‘sto stronzo?) e Forlani nei 1980s;
b) la non-crescita della produttività delle risorse (e quindi del PIL) dagli stessi anni, fine-fine del Miracolo.
Il combinato disposto e’ già insostenibile agli attuali spread. Ancor più a tassi d’interesse più elevatiIL DEFAULT DEI BOTS ENTRO PRIMAVERA 2011: nei prossimi mesi gli attacchi ad ariete della “speculazione” saranno contro i 2 colossi d’argilla, Spagna ed Italia, che ne’ la Germania vuole, ne’ l’IMF può salvare in ultima istanza: TOO BIG 2 B BAILED OUT (sono già cominciati a fine novembre, con l’allungarsi ulteriore degli spread). Ma l’Italia si troverà senza governo… Qualsiasi reazione strategica di Zapatero (credo non tanto “rigore” -sic- fiscale, ma flessibilità e mercati liberi), aggraverà gli spread dei bot i-tagliani.
Chi ha avuto la pazza, idiota e fetente idea di buttare tutti, inclusi i poveri Cristi barocco-decadenti (DA SECOLI) del Portogallo, in uno stesso EURO-calderone? E, per di più, il tutto SENZA DEI CONTINUI E SISTEMATICI, RIGOROSI E PRECISI meccanismi di compensazione finanziaria, fiscale e nelle strutture industriali. Per non parlare di convergenze nelle società civili ed istituzioni, che impiegano secoli.
Oppure, assai + semplicemente: nessun €.Non era un romano, o Romano?
Phastidio.net
La corda al collo
30 NOV.
Secondo un analista di JPMorgan, una decurtazione di “solo” il 20 per cento del valore di rimborso di titoli di stato greci, irlandesi, spagnoli e portoghesi determinerebbe l’azzeramento del capitale proprio delle banche francesi. E’ sempre più drammaticamente chiaro che fare ciò che andrebbe fatto (colpire gli obbligazionisti senior) determinerebbe il crollo del sistema bancario europeo.
Altro dato che, più che parlare, urla: il tasso d’interesse medio che l’Irlandapagherà sul prestito congiunto di Ue e FMI è del 5,8 per cento complessivo. Dal 2014 il servizio di questo debito sarà pari a circa il 25 per cento delle entrate del paese. Secondo i dati storici di Moody’s, la percentuale di servizio del debito sul totale delle entrate che provoca il default è del 22 per cento. Il piano di “aiuti” per l’Irlanda è semplicemente infattibile.
La strada dell’inferno è lastricata di salvataggi
MONDAY, 29 NOVEMBER, 2010
in ECONOMIA & MERCATO,ITALIA,UNIONE EUROPEA
Da dove cominciamo, volendo peraltro essere sintetici? Da una circostanza che ci ha colpito nei giorni scorsi: un numero ampio e crescente di cittadini irlandesi si dicono favorevoli al default dello stato nei confronti degli obbligazionisti bancari, in luogo di un devastante programma di austerità che lascerà il paese in condizioni di prostrazione per molti anni a venire. Eppure, le idee di Unione europea e FMI sono molto chiare: nessuna ristrutturazione per le obbligazioni bancarie senior.
ENGLISH SPEAKING SECTION OF THE POST on the Italian default.
The worst is just coming: be patient, please!
Dec. 3
wsj
Spain Faces Hurdles on Reforms
With markets increasing pressure on Spain, Prime Minister José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero is running out of the political capital necessary to force through difficult reforms that could ease investor concerns.
Nov.30
ftalphaville.ft.com
Are Belgium and Italy safe?
Neil Hume (with his emphases) quotes the Citigroup chief economist, Willem ‘Maverecon’ Buiter
Portugal and Greece:
After an Irish agreement with the EU/IMF, the market’s attention is likely to turn to Portugal’s sovereign, which at current levels of interest rates and growth rates, is less dramatically, but quietly, insolvent, in our view. We consider it likely that it will need to access the EFSF soon.
Greece is de facto insolvent, in our view, all the more so after the recent debt and deficit revisions. As long as Greece remains sufficiently compliant with the conditionality of its EU/IMF program, sovereign debt restructuring is likely to be postponed at least until mid-2013, when its EU/IMF programme expires. At that point, it likely will be transferred to the EFSF or its successor. Whether its debt will be restructured at that stage, including haircuts, will depend on factors beyond the sustainability of its debt.
Spain:
For now, the markets have put Spain in Italy’s sovereign risk class when, in our view, it should be closer to Portugal and Ireland once its banking sector problems are recognised. We argued before that the EFSF should be much larger (€2trn). Should Spain need assistance, it will stretch the resources of the EFSF, perhaps beyond its current limits. There may be some room to expand the size of the EFSF. But, in our view, once Spain needs assistance, the support of the ECB will be critical (by purchasing Spanish sovereign debt through its Securities Markets Program — SMP — and funding Spanish banks using Spanish sovereign debt or sovereign-guaranteed financial instruments as collateral or by making loans to or purchasing the debt of the EFSF, legally a limited liability company that could even be made an eligible counterparty of the Eurosystem for this purpose).
In the longer term, there may be a need for large-scale restructuring of the debt of the Spanish banking sector and possibly the sovereign. At longer horizons, high debt levels and political instability in Italy and Belgium may yet give rise to fundamentally warranted sovereign debt crises, while self-justifying crises are possible even in the near term, despite roughly balanced structural primary budgets.
And if you thought that the EU/IMF bailout marked the end of Ireland’s troubles, think again says Buiter:
Accessing external sources of funds will not mark the end of Ireland’s troubles. The reason is that, in our view, the consolidated Irish sovereign and Irish domestic financial system is de facto insolvent. The Irish sovereign cannot from its own resources ‘bail out’ the banks and make its own creditors whole. In addition, a fully-fledged bailout (permanent fiscal transfer) from EA partners or the ECB is most unlikely. Therefore, either the unsecured non-guaranteed creditors of the banks, and/or the creditors of the sovereign may eventually have to accept a restructuring with an NPV haircut, even if it is not a condition for accessing the EFSF or the EFSM at present.
Nov. 27 wsj:
Traders’ Targets: Portugal and Spain
Investors are concerned that European countries’ funding problems could spread to much-bigger economies, such as Spain, Italy or even France, where a bailout could be impractical.
Nov. 26 wsj:
Slow Growth Stymies Portugal
Unlike Greece or Ireland, Portugal is finding itself in the crosshairs of investors largely because of a chronic weakness: Over the past decade, it couldn’t adapt to globalization and failed to grow.
Read the last paper for a photography of the Portuguese UNDESERVED mess. My comment.
WANTED: The criminal and idiot that invented
1) the €
2) and its imlementation without any integration process, and structural correction process;
in such a way as to throw the poor baroque, and decadent Portuguese people in such a mess – just because of the “social experiments” (à la Mao Zedong) and mistakes committed elsewhere; in Berlin and London, Washington DC and Wall Street. And in Bruxelles by whom? I can’t remember: was he a roman guy perhaps? Roman? Romanesque, in the sense attributed by Leopardi…
de(e)pre(ce)ssion 