G 20: the real start is in April – RIMANDATI AD APRILE

Photo: January 30, 2007. REUTERS/Jason Reed

The Times cartoon. © Peter Brooks

0811_st-barack

QUASI BOCCIATI, RIMANDATI AD APRILE.

ITALIAN SUMMARY.

ASPETTANDO B.Ob. LA TELA DI RAGNO DI GORDON BROWN, laburista annacquato.

LI PENSAVAMO BOCCIATI; INVECE SON SOLO RIMANDATI AD APRILE: e’ un risulato magro ma sopra le aspettative.

Il G20 era atteso come  un buco nell’acqua, invece ha sorpeso, pur senza entusiasmare affatto:

– da un lato, ultimo grido liberista del 2° Millennio, seppellito nel marzo-settembre 2008

– dall’altro, un primo vagito del nuovo millennio Chindiano che avanza: focus sulla regolazione forte (?) della Finanza, anche se .. leggete il testo finale integrale: final statement. Le rating agencies? Devono … registrarsi, e’ tutto. Ma erano ben note e nelle dita di una mano!  Niente guillotine per  il loro top management, non una notte in prigione e nemmeno a casa senza liquidazione. Il FT le aveva trovate con le dita nella marmellata: usavano modelli TRUCCATI per valutare il rischio, lo sapevano e coprivano per mesi e mesi, continuando a barare.  Al confronto, il Watergate era una cosa da educande.

– Occhio Obama: col gradualismo alla Gordon Brown non si va da nessuna parte, si lasciano tutti gli attori e le istituzioni-chiave al loro posto. CI VUOLE UNA RIVOLUZIONE (al momento senza nome, così sarà più creativa ed al passo coi problemi).

 

AND THE WINNER IS …

Surprise surprise: Gordon Brown again, the win-win guy of global summits! 

For  a sorting out lame-duck (GWB, US), another one (GB, GB) stays with us forever. Gordon Brown had reached below zero poll evaluations, for his treacherous delaying tactics on Northern Rock: oh, dear! He was so shy and  timid (Blair complex?),  before statalism became fashionable again (the real Millennium cut is in 2008, either March or September). But now he’s the star, at least before B.Ob. enters the stage.

wsj

 

Brown Wins Reform Demands

U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown appeared to win many of his key demands to reform the global regulatory system and restart the Doha round of trade talks at the meeting of G-20 

As expected by everybody, lame duck GWB did not get anything from  Sat. 15th G20 meeting. Markets didn’t bet a buck on such a meeting, so perhaps they will not fall down dramatically on Monday. The G20:

+ has already become a focal institution (as Gordon Brown has underlined), and will have some work to do next year, particularly in the next meeting before April 30. First of all, verify whether the March deadline (see G20 document below) has been met for the emergency Global Finance re-regulation. By now the G20:

did not start any coordination of fiscal stimuli (from now on  the focus of policies), nor of  monetary and credit policy guidelines; in such a way, national and (at most) regional policies are already ending up: either  in “beggar your neighbour”; or becoming a ground for knittimg new international alliances: e.g., see the rge discussion on China’s fiscal plan:

the timing of the Chinese package is likely influenced both by domestic demands, and the external outlook. The timing before the G20 heads of state is clearly significant.

 

The hypothesis sounds right to me. China is trying to knit alliances around the US, to decouple.

+ dealt mainly with the financial meltdown, with a gradual approach (not mentioning the roots of today’s problems);

+ further work might follow, namely in the FSF coordinated by Mr Draghi, which should include BRIC and deal with change in  Bretton Wood institutions;

  –  no real finance reform, nonetheless: look at RATING AGENCIES (perhaps the most bastard subcriminals, the FT found them conspiring and treaching). They just need to … register !!!  Fuckoff.

 Pleaded for pursuing an “Open Global Economy”, AS IF it was not a dead walking: sooner or later bailout protectionism will give the floor to trade protectionism and capital controls; we bet the deadline of resurrecting the Doha Round by December  will NOT work;

apparently ignored the risks of an open deflation, signalled by the lack of response of gold and stock markets to the massive national rescue plans.  

∑ – Final G20 mark: – 5 + 3 = -2.  Only such a nerd as G Brown gets good marks! The other pupils most come back in the April session, with new essays 2B evaluated.

Even if its financial and institutional (IMF and WB) plan had to be timely applied, this would not change much of the current severe global recession by insufficient demand, on the verge of degenerating into a low consumption-led depression in the US – on behalf of the irresponsibility and laissez faire of Pres. Bush and his staff, even after the subcrime bubble imploded in August 2007, i.e. 15 months ago: 15 months lost, waiting for Godot. Luckily Godot is about to come from Chicago. This is why Russia asked to recall the G20 soon, and got it.

The real test will be whether their minimalist approach to focus upon an immediate stabilisation of financial markets will get any result soon. Dedline: March 31. This is the core of their long final statement:

9. We commit to implementing policies consistent with the following common principles for reform.

• Strengthening Transparency and Accountability: We will strengthen financial market transparency, including by enhancing required disclosure on complex financial products and ensuring complete and accurate disclosure by firms of their financial conditions. Incentives should be aligned to avoid excessive risk-taking.

• Enhancing Sound Regulation: We pledge to strengthen our regulatory regimes, prudential oversight, and risk management, and ensure that all financial markets, products and participants are regulated or subject to oversight, as appropriate to their circumstances. We will exercise strong oversight over credit rating agencies, consistent with the agreed and strengthened international code of conduct. We will also make regulatory regimes more effective over the economic cycle, while ensuring that regulation is efficient, does not stifle innovation, and encourages expanded trade in financial products and services. We commit to transparent assessments of our national regulatory systems.

 Promoting Integrity in Financial Markets: We commit to protect the integrity of the world’s financial markets by bolstering investor and consumer protection, avoiding conflicts of interest, preventing illegal market manipulation, fraudulent activities and abuse, and protecting against illicit finance risks arising from non-cooperative jurisdictions. We will also promote information sharing, including with respect to jurisdictions that have yet to commit to international standards with respect to bank secrecy and transparency.

 Reinforcing International Cooperation: We call upon our national and regional regulators to formulate their regulations and other measures in a consistent manner. Regulators should enhance their coordination and cooperation across all segments of financial markets, including with respect to cross-border capital flows. Regulators and other relevant authorities as a matter of priority should strengthen cooperation on crisis prevention, management, and resolution.

• Reforming International Financial Institutions: We are committed to advancing the reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions so that they can more adequately reflect changing economic weights in the world economy in order to increase their legitimacy and effectiveness. In this respect, emerging and developing economies, including the poorest countries, should have greater voice and representation. The Financial Stability Forum (FSF – directed by Mr Draghi, NdR) must expand urgently to a broader membership of emerging economies, and other major standard setting bodies should promptly review their membership. The IMF, in collaboration with the expanded FSF and other bodies, should work to better identify vulnerabilities, anticipate potential stresses, and act swiftly to play a key role in crisis response. 

Today’s rge is full of interesting clusters on G20 related issues:

  •  G20 Nations Agree More Concerted Efforts, Regulatory Coordination
  •  Will Coordinated Policy Interventions Prevent a Global Recession?
  •  Towards A New Financial Order: Regulatory Issues Tackled At The G-20
  •  Liquidity Trap Possibility: What’s the Solution?
     G20 Nations Debate Coordinated Fiscal Stimulus
     Economists Debate: What Should Be Accomplished at the G20?

goto subcrime social science

On Palms’ Sunday, the Fed said: back to the 1930s

More in our special report pdf (May 3 updated v.)subcrimesocialscience080503

Palms’ Sunday, we finally realised that a domino effect, potentially self-destroying for most banks and capitalisms was there, at hand and sight (had perhaps Keynes understood something even Marx had missed?). Well, but, if the ‘30s are back, the two greatest John (Steinbeck and Ford) are back as well: we’ll collect and tell the story of every single proletarian, of all the Joad and Ortiz families. Nikola Chesnais will help us to turn the films, since John Ford is his paradigm, and Ford filmed Grapes of Wrath immediately after the book (1939-40).This film was the most popular left-leaning, socialistic-themed film of pre-World War II Hollywood“. At Washington Post, BRIGIDA SCHULTE already started telling us about Gloria Ortiz and her husband: we love them now: they don’t American Dream any more; we dream to encourage and help them. The Joads, the Ortiz, and new gold rush prospectors. FT March 29, p.1: Soaring prices spark fresh rush to find Ca.’s forgotten gold.

subcrime social science is an art

subcrimesocialscience was a 20 pp. (now 30) w-in-p survey, adopting the de(e)pre(ce)ssion Political Economy paradigm (Ricardo- Marx, Keynes- Kalecki, Schumpeter- Minsky- Perez, Aglietta and Chesnais). It briefly reviews, in its early pages, what economic sciences know on ongoing:

KONDRATIEV LONG WAVE (197os +)

Minsky Magic Moments, since Summer 2007

Minsky Financial Meltdown, we are on the border of

2008+ deep&long recession, endowed with a depression potential

FAQ. Might Capitalisms succeed where Socialisms failed: to help us coping with them, undermining and overthrowing them? Then it deals with policies and recession chronicle highlights. Here is a summary on economic policies.

” De(e)pre(ce)ssion 7 capital virtues: remedies for the Minsky Meltdown.

1. Minsky won the bet versus Chicago. The latter did not survive to the great Milton Friedman for longer, and finally died at dawn, Friday March 14, 2008 (on Bear Stearns’ day: p.15 here).
2. States will massively intervene, after decades of anti-State mind washing: how effectively?
3. After March 14, oil into firing debates on credit&fiscal policies: moral hazard of rewarding – again – those fucking rentiers, vampires that already gained 6-0 the early sets of the subprime match.
4. Leaders’ war. March 29 FT (Not yet time for a bail-out of banks) versus March 22 The Economist (Wall street’s crisis): both are over-Bullish, but policies clash. FT delays a bail-out fiscal policy, conditional upon sacking the rentiers (“it should do so only over the dead bodies of shareholders and management” – falling in love with FT). The Eco. advocates hyper-fiscal policies, erecting floors “either in housing, or in asset-backed securities”. FT objects housing prices must stop to a floor before, otherwise you can’t price securities. At 19th C The Eco., they found a Hegelian synthesis: neo-Leviathans will buy the open and the foreclosed apt.s: almost everything. Socialist times.
5. All this policy makers (hyper-)activism is and will be part of the process (Roudini’s blog, Feb. 8), in a self-referential crisis system (Niklas Luhman), where no one is sitting outside the system. As in an ancient Myth, financial accelerators ate Bernanke himself: their father.
6. Minsky’s call for an institutions-specific and even a capitalisms-specific analysis (note 10) might be the compass exploiting the fixed point of an endogenous institutions axiom.
7. The latter fits with self-referential systems theory, and this couple is full of well known (in their proper cognitive, policy theoretical domains), important consequences.”

On Minsky’s suggestions,

see monetary policies in:

Wray 2007; Galbraith,

Giovannoni and Russo 2007.

Please note – from the 7 points above – that we converge much with Roubini, although we get there by different arguments and ways. Knowing already, by him, the most likely end of the story (script of Grapes of Wrath 2: by H. P. Minsky).